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*"It is God who provides livestock for you, some for riding and some for your food: you have other benefits in them too. You can reach any destination you wish on them: they carry you by land, as ships carry you on the sea. He shows you His signs; which then of the signs of God will you deny?"*

***[Al-Qur'an, Ghafir: 79-81]***

*Narrated Abu Huraira (rta):*

*The Prophet (pbuh) said, "Whoever believes in Allah and the Last Day, should not hurt his neighbour and whoever believes in Allah and the Last Day, should serve his guest generously and whoever believes in Allah and the Last Day, should speak what is good or keep silent."*

***[Sahih Al-Bukhari: 6136]***

***"In the early stages of the state, taxes are light in their incidence, but fetch in a large revenue; in the later stages the incidence of taxation increases while the aggregate revenue falls off."***

***Ibn Khaldun***

## *Inside This Issue*



# Is a Crypto Asset Mal? The Hanafi View – Part 3

Dr. Farrukh Habib
Founder & CEO, Azka Advisors (UK)
Co-Founder of Alif Technologies (Dubai)
https://www.linkedin.com/in/drfarrukhhabib/

Part 2 of this series asked whether crypto assets are property (mal) under the Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali schools. The answer, at the level of the asset class, was yes. But that left one question open: whether specific crypto assets are actually lawful in Shari'ah. That question was deferred, and this series takes it up later, alongside the Hanafi school's own version of the same question. This part asks whether crypto assets are mal under the Hanafi school, and it needs a part of its own, because the Hanafi school does not approach the question the same way.

The Jumhur, the three schools covered in Part 2, fold lawful benefit into the definition of mal itself. So, for them, mal is something that is already lawful. Anything unlawful is not mal. The Hanafi school has more basic criteria for mal, and then it splits mal into lawful and unlawful. Meaning, first it asks whether something is mal at all, without yet asking whether it is lawful or unlawful. Mal that is lawful in Hanafi fiqh is called mal mutaqawwam: wealth the law protects and permits to be exchanged.

In Hanafi school, saying something is not mal at all is different from saying, it is mal but unlawful. The first claim removes the thing from the law of wealth completely. The second keeps it inside that law and then restricts it. This part deals only with the first question, whether a crypto asset is mal at all. The second question, whether it is also lawful or not, is addressed in the later articles of this series.

## 1. Stage One: Mal as the Broader Genus

The Hanafi jurists never settled on one single definition of mal. Several definitions recur in different books. Although their wording differs, they describe the same picture. The most quoted version is transmitted by Ibn Nujaym (رحمه الله) and Ibn Abidin (رحمه الله):

*"Mal is that toward which human nature inclines, and which can be retained for a time of need." [1]*

The Ottoman Majalla codifies the same idea in Article 126:

*"Mal is that toward which human nature inclines, and which can be retained until a time of need, whether movable or immovable." [2]*

Other Hanafi authorities, such as al-Sarakhsi (رحمه الله), al-Taftazani (رحمه الله), and the author of al-Hawi al-Qudsi, describe the same idea in slightly different words. [3] These are not competing definitions. They are the same definitions seen from different angles.

### 1.1 The al-mal and al-milk distinction

Before listing the elements of mal, one distinction needs to be made clear, because the rest of this part depends on it. Hanafi doctrine treats mal as narrower than a broader concept called al-milk, meaning ownership, or a legally protected proprietary interest. Article 125 of the Majalla defines al-milk broadly:

*"Al-milk is whatever a person owns, whether corporeal objects or usufructs." [4]*

The concept of mal is narrower than al-milk. Ibn Abidin (رحمه الله) states the distinction directly:

*"The correct position is that a usufruct is al-milk but not mal. Al-milk is whatever a person may exclusively dispose of, while mal is whatever can be retained so that benefit may be taken from it at a time of need." [5]*

So, a usufruct can be al-milk, something a person owns and controls, without ever becoming mal, because it does not last long enough to be retained. It exists and is consumed in the same movement. This is why the Hanafi default position treats usufructs and mere rights as falling outside mal. It is also why the Hanafi jurists still had to make specific exceptions, which the next section covers.

### 1.2 The elements of mal

Taken together, these definitions point to five elements.

- It must be an ayn: a physical object, not a benefit that exists only intangibly. Some Hanafi jurists put this directly, describing mal as "a physical object over which people compete and which is exchanged for consideration." [6]
- It must be capable of being captured (Ihraz): exclusive possession, or effective control. Actual possession is not required. What matters is whether the thing can be captured or controlled at all.
- It must be capable of being retained or stored, meaning it can be preserved instead of vanishing the instant it comes into being.
- It must serve a real, meaningful human interest, not a fanciful or negligible one. A single grain of wheat or a drop of water is not mal on its own, since nobody preserves, competes for, or pays for that very small amount.
- People must actually treat it as wealth. This is the decisive, objective test. Ibn Abidin (رحمه الله) states it in a line that recurs throughout this series: "The quality of being mal is established when all people, or some of them, treat the thing as wealth or property." [7] Universal agreement is not needed. If a recognized group of people treats something as mal, that is enough.

### 1.3 Ihraz: Ability to Capture, not tangibility

The ihraz element deserves a closer look, because the crypto argument later depends on it. The classical Hanafi scholars mention that air, gas, sunlight, and moonlight are excluded from mal, not because they lack physical existence, but because nobody can bring them under exclusive control. The exclusion is about capturability, not physical form. Once something can be separately captured and controlled, that exclusion no longer applies. For example, compressed air or gas held in a container satisfies ihraz in a way open air never can, even though nothing about the air itself has changed [8]. What changed is control, not the substance.

## 2. Stage Two: Permissibility (Taqawwum)

Something being mal is not the end of the analysis. The Hanafi school adds a second stage, called taqawwum (permissibility), which asks whether that mal is also mal mutaqawwam: asset the Shari'ah allows to benefit from and permits to be exchanged. Ibn Abidin (رحمه الله) states the relationship between the two stages precisely, using wine as the example:

*"Mal is broader than mutaqawwam. Mal is that which can be retained even if it is not lawfully permitted, such as wine. Mutaqawwam is that which can be retained together with lawful permissibility." [9]*

So, wine is mal in Hanafi school. It exists physically, and people treat it as wealth, retain it, and exchange it. But it is not mutaqawwam, because the Shari'ah does not permit deriving benefit from it. The Hanafi structure keeps these two findings separate instead of merging them into one.

This part does not attempt a full taqawwum analysis for crypto assets, for the same reason Part 2 deferred its own equivalent question. Lawful benefit has to be judged asset by asset, not for the whole class at once, and that analysis belongs later in this series, once the Hanafi and Jumhur approaches can be compared side by side.

## 3. The Restriction, and How It Actually Bends

A usufruct is al-milk but not mal, and an abstract right is not a physical object capable of being captured or controlled either. Because of this, the Hanafi default position does not consider them mal. Ibn Abidin (رحمه الله) states the default rule and its exceptions in a single passage:

*"Compensation may not be taken for abstract rights detached from ownership. Such rights do not admit of transfer of ownership, and settlement for them is not valid. Destroying an abstract right does not create liability, because compensation for an abstract right is void, unless it extinguishes a confirmed right, in which case it is treated like the destruction of actual ownership for purposes of liability. Excluded from this are the right of retaliation, the marital tie, and the right of servitude, for compensation may be taken for these." [10]*

This passage does two things at once. It states the restriction, and it also mentions exceptions to it, and the exceptions matter more for this series. The essential definition of mal never changes. A mere right does not turn into a physical, retainable object just because an exception applies to it. What changes is the Islamic legal treatment. Hanafi jurists identified specific ways a right or benefit can receive the ruling of mal without becoming mal in its essential nature. Three such ways are relevant here.

### 3.1 Way #1: subordination to a tangible asset

The clearest way is subordination to a physical object that is already mal. The classic example is the right of passage, haqq al-murur, the right to use a specific road or path. Al-Muhit al-Burhani explains why it counts as mal: "The right of passage was given the ruling of maliyyah by way of subordination, so it may be exchanged for part of the price." [11] Fath al-Qadir gives the reasoning in one line: "The right of passage is a right attached to the corpus of the land, and the land is mal, being a physical object. Whatever is attached to it takes the ruling of that object." [12]

The right to draw water, haqq al-shirb, works similarly but with a twist. It is normally sold only as an attachment to land, but Fath al-Qadir records one narration where it can be sold on its own: "This differs from the water-right, whose sale is valid as subordinate to the land by unanimous narrations, and independently according to one narration, which is the position adopted by the jurists of Balkh, because it represents an actual share of water, and for this reason it creates liability if destroyed." [13] The water-right can stand alone here because it resolves to a specific, measurable share of a physical substance (water). The closer a 'right' sits to something physical and identifiable, the more easily Hanafi doctrine treats it as mal.

### 3.2 Way #2: a valid contract

The second way is the lease contract, ijarah. A usufruct is not mal by itself, but once it becomes the object of a valid lease, it is treated as mal for the purposes of that contract. Al-Sarakhsi (رحمه الله) explains this: "Whatever is valid as a counter-value in a sale is also valid in a lease, because usufructs carry the ruling of wealth, or the contract itself establishes for them the ruling of maliyyah." [14] The usufruct itself does not become a physical object. The contract simply treats it as one, because the Islamic law recognizes a real and constant human need for leasing the usufruct without the physical object.

### 3.3 Way #3: Urf-recognized financial value

The third way is custom. The exceptions named earlier, the right of retaliation, the marital tie, and the right of servitude, are not attached to a physical object and are not leased. They are compensable because each is what Hanafi jurists call an original entitlement, a right that exists in its own right rather than merely to prevent harm. Ibn Abidin (رحمه الله) makes the same point about the right to a religious or endowed post, haqq al-wazifah: “It is not hidden that the holder of a post has that right established for him by the judge’s confirmation, as an original entitlement, not as a means of removing harm from him. Attaching it to the right of a service-bequest, and to the right of retaliation and what follows it, is therefore more fitting.” [15]

Custom also works through registration and ordinary commercial dealing. A trade name or trademark, once officially registered, becomes valuable in the custom of traders and is treated in circulation the way tangible property is treated, subject to two conditions: the name must be lawfully registered, since an unregistered name does not count as mal in traders’ custom, and the sale must not involve deception against consumers [16].

What unites all three ways is a single method. A right or benefit does not become mal in its essential nature. It receives the ruling of mal through subordination, through contract, or through custom. This is one consistent approach running through the Hanafi school, not three unrelated exceptions.

## 4. The Contemporary Urf-Based Extension

The classical ways were built around rights of way, leases, and named legal entitlements. Modern Hanafi fatwa literature extended the same reasoning to assets the earlier jurists never had occasion to consider. Two of these are related directly to crypto assets: electricity and copyright.

### 4.1 Electricity

Electricity is not a physical object in the classical sense. It cannot be seen or held the way grain or cloth can. Contemporary Hanafi fatwas still treat its sale as valid, on the same capture-and-control logic described above. Fatawa Haqqania puts it directly:

*“Since it is not necessary for the object of sale to be an ayn (physical object), if something is not a physical object but is customarily considered mal, its sale is valid. Electricity, although not a physical object, may therefore be validly bought and sold, because things of this kind fall within maliyyah.” [17]*

Ashraf Ali Thanawi (رحمه الله) reaches the same conclusion earlier, with an analogy that fits this part’s argument closely:

*“It is not hidden that electricity and air are things people desire. Each of them, once one has power over it and takes possession of it, is mal, like water in a waterskin.” [18]*

Mufti Taqi Usmani (دامت بركاتهم العالية) affirms the same ruling in Fiqh al-Buyu, where he cites Sheikh Thanawi’s (رحمه الله) position directly. [19]

Water is not mal while it runs freely in a river, for the same reason open air is not mal. Once it is held in a waterskin or a container, it becomes mal. Electricity follows the same pattern. It is not mal as an unharnessed physical phenomenon, but it becomes mal once captured, metered, and delivered under someone’s control.

### 4.2 Copyright

Copyright is a cleaner precedent for a purely intangible asset, since it involves no physical medium at all, not even captured air or metered electricity. Fatawa Haqqania draws a distinction between two kinds of mere rights:

*"The right of authorship, though it belongs to the category of mere rights, and mere rights are themselves of two kinds. One kind has a financial benefit attached to it, such as the right to a post. The other kind has no financial benefit attached, such as the right of pre-emption. Islamic law permits taking compensation for relinquishing rights of the first kind. Since the right of authorship now has a financial benefit attached to it in the present age, its sale and purchase are valid. In fiqhi terminology this is called the right of precedence, haqq al-asbaqiyyah." [20]*

The same source extends this logic further, treating the classical ways as one expanding principle rather than three separate, closed categories:

*"It should be valid to take compensation for the right to build upward, the water-right, and the drainage-right, just as relinquishing a post and similar rights has been permitted." [21]*

Trade licenses and business goodwill follow the same custom-based reasoning. Fatawa Dar al-Uloom Zakariyya states plainly that selling a trade license is an established market practice, and that traders' custom treats it the way it treats mal, so it carries the ruling of mal. [22]

Mufti Taqi Usmani (دامت برکاتهم العالية) also holds the same position of permissibility of trade of trademarks, tradenames, trade licenses, and copyrights with the same conditions. [23] In fact, he has outlined a framework of five conditions on the basis of which the sale of any abstract rights, not limited to the ones previously mentioned, is allowed. The five conditions are:

- The right must be established in the present, rather than merely anticipated in the future.
- The right must belong to its holder as an original entitlement, rather than existing only to ward off harm.
- The right must be capable of passing from one person to another.
- The right must be precisely defined and free of excessive uncertainty (gharar) or ignorance (jahalah).
- The traders customarily deal with it, in its circulation, the way they deal with tangible property and wealth. [24]

These five conditions are not a new doctrine. They summarize, as a simple checklist, what the examples above already show case by case.

## 5. Testing Crypto Assets Against the Full Hanafi Structure

Crypto assets are not one uniform thing, and the two ways described above do not apply to every crypto asset in the same manner. Depending on what kind of asset it is, a crypto asset can take the ruling of mal through one of these two ways.

### 5.1 The way of subordination and capture

Some crypto assets exist as an independent, self-contained unit. They do not represent a claim against an issuer or a counterparty; the unit itself is the thing being held. For assets like this, the relevant question is not whether they are a physical object in the way grain or cloth is, since that is not the actual test. The real test is capturability, and an asset of this kind can be fully captured as an intangible thing can be. It sits at a specific, identifiable position on a ledger, and whoever holds the private key controls it exclusively and continuously, arguably more tightly than a person controls water in a water-skin. This is the same logic that makes captured electricity mal: not a physical object, but something that becomes a controlled, retainable asset once brought under exclusive human control. An asset of this kind satisfies capture on the same basis electricity does, and satisfies retention the same way Part 2 documented, describing wallets left untouched for years at a time.

### 5.2 The way of urf-recognition

Other crypto assets work differently. Rather than standing as a self-contained unit, they represent a right or an entitlement against a specific protocol, counterparty, or a reserve, closer in kind to copyright or a trade license than to a captured physical thing. For crypto assets like this, the relevant test is the five conditions already given.

1. Is it established in the present, rather than merely anticipated? A confirmed balance or a specific allocation of a crypto asset unit recorded on a ledger exists now. It is not a hope that something may be issued later.
2. Is it an original entitlement, rather than merely protective? The holder's power to retain, transfer, or dispose of such crypto asset is a positive power, not a defensive one that exists only to prevent harm.
3. Is it transferable? A signed transaction moves control of such crypto asset from one party to another, which is exactly what this condition asks for.
4. Is it precisely defined, free of excessive uncertainty (gharar) and ignorance (jahalah)? The ledger records an exact quantity at an exact position, a higher degree of definition than many of the classical rights this test was built to judge.
5. Do the traders customarily treat it the way they treat tangible property? Part 2 documented adoption at national scale, widespread wallet ownership, and use as a payment rail and a store of value across several economies.

An asset of this kind can clear all five conditions. This way, separately from the first, also places crypto assets within mal.

Which of these two ways applies to a given crypto asset depends on what that asset actually is. We will settle that question for each type of asset in the taxonomy part of this series, not this one. What this part establishes is simply: under one of these two ways, a crypto asset can be considered mal under the Hanafi structure.

## 6. Scope Limits and What Comes Next

Crypto assets, in general, pass the first Hanafi stage. They are mal. That finding does not by itself make them permissible asset (mal mutaqawwam), since taqawwum is a separate stage with its own test, addressed here only in outline and deferred in full to a later part, for the same reasons Part 2 deferred the equivalent question under the Jumhur framework. It does not resolve the status of any specific coin, token, or platform, since that requires asset-by-asset analysis this series defers deliberately. This article shows that the Jumhur and Hanafi frameworks reach the same first-stage conclusion, that crypto assets in general are mal, but they reach it by different routes. And all these schools of fiqh place the lawful-benefit question at different points in the analysis. In the next article (Part 4), we will compare those two routes side by side, and show exactly where they align and where they diverge.

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[24] Majallat Majma al-Fiqh al-Islami, vol. 5, p. 1935.

# The Late Dr. Muhammad Umar Chapra

By H. Abdur Raqeeb
General Secretary, Indian Centre for Islamic Finance, New Delhi

Dr. Muhammad Umar Chapra (February 1, 1933 – June 13, 2026) was a prominent economist, researcher, professor, and intellectual. During his student days, he was associated with Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba Karachi, and thereafter, throughout his life, he remained actively engaged in the field of knowledge and scholarship as a servant of Islam. As an author of numerous scholarly books and a creative thinker in Islamic economics, he left an indelible mark.

In 2007, the complex process of subprime mortgage defaults in the United States—where impoverished populations living below the poverty line failed to fulfil their housing loan repayments—brought major global capitalistic financial institutions and banks to the brink of bankruptcy. On the one hand, this crisis exposed the negative impacts and harmful consequences of the modern economic and financial system to the world. On the other hand, for the first time, it compelled the entire global community to seriously consider Islam's economic and financial system and created an inclination to implement it.

Consequently, the Chairman of the World Economic Forum declared: "We have now reached the final point, leaving us with only one alternative: either we change our current approach or face continuous decline and suffering."

The Pope at the Vatican presented the principles of Islamic finance to Western bankers as a solution to the global economic crisis, stating that the moral principles upon which Islamic investment is founded would bring banks closer to their customers and make it possible to achieve the true spirit of the services they render.

**International Seminar:** In July 2005, following the onset of the global financial crisis, a Reserve Bank of India Working Group was constituted under the chairmanship of Mr. Anand Sinha at the behest of the Indian government to draft a report on the practices used in Islamic finance.

History will bear witness that to draw the attention of India's political and legal institutions toward Islamic economics and interest-free banking, Jamaat-e-Islami Hind organized an international seminar titled "*The Message of Islamic Banking: Justice & Equity*" in New Delhi in February 2006. This seminar was held under the supervision of Dr. Nejatullah Siddiqi and was attended by globally renowned Islamic bankers, economic experts, and leading intellectuals. Participants included Dr. Umar Chapra, Dr. Mabid Al-Jarhi, Dr. Monzer Kahf, Dr. Mansoor Durrani, Irfan Siddiqui, and Ismail Shariff. Dr. Fazlur Rahman Faridi delivered the keynote address, and the then-Amir of Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, Dr. Muhammad Abdul Haq Ansari, presided over the event.

The renowned economist, Dr. Umar Chapra, delivered a keynote address focusing on how interest-free banking can serve as a vehicle for socio-economic justice, the eradication of poverty, and broad human welfare. In fact, immediately following World War II, economic thinkers of Western capitalist thought set aside partnership models and made interest-based debt the foundation of growth, spreading a web across global financial markets.

In this regard, Professor Chapra highlighted the following key economic concepts:

**1 - Eradication of Exploitation:** The primary objective of prohibiting *Riba* (interest) is to prevent injustice and exploitation wherein a limited number of wealthy lenders take advantage of the borrower.

**2 - Profit and Loss Sharing:** Supported by data and evidence, he advocated for a fair financial system that establishes justice by emphasizing moral aspects and the principles of profit-and-loss sharing over the fixed-return, debt-based system prevalent in capitalism. In this model, the entity or individual providing financial resources acts as a business partner participating in profits and losses rather than just a lender.

**3 - Equitable Distribution of Wealth:** He explained that the Islamic financial system promotes the circulation of wealth. It supports charitable mechanisms like *Zakat* to reduce social inequality and empower poor and underprivileged classes.

**4 - Broad Economic Transformation:** Achieving true equality and justice requires a robust moral framework, effective corporate governance, and supportive socio-economic policies. This endeavour cannot be carried out by religious scholars (*Ulama*) alone; it requires the active participation of conscious intellectuals across society.

After attending this international seminar, Dr. Chapra visited Jaipur, Rajasthan. There, he addressed businessmen and influential members of society in an engaging, accessible language, detailing the importance of trade and the parameters of a business free from interest (*Riba*) and ambiguity (*Gharar*), which deeply impressed the audience.

**The Islamic Concept of Development in Light of Maqasid al-Shari'ah:** This key paper by Dr. Chapra was published by the Islamic Fiqh Academy. In it, he explained that the objective of the *Shari'ah* is to secure benefits for people and protect them from harm and corruption. Citing Imam al-Ghazali, he noted that al-Ghazali emphasized the protection of the five fundamental goals (*Maqasid al-Khamsah*): faith, life, intellect, lineage, and wealth. Nearly three centuries later, Imam Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi concurred with al-Ghazali in interpreting the goals of *Shari'ah*, adding other objectives indicated by the Qur'an and Sunnah, asserting that if these five are considered the primary objectives, all other goals can be subsumed under them.

Dr. Umar Chapra states: "It is necessary for human beings to continuously strive to expand upon both primary and secondary objectives so that their well-being continuously improves. Changes in needs and circumstances affect not just individuals, but society as a whole. Times have changed, needs have evolved and grown, and taking all of this into account, these objectives require ongoing discussion and debate." *(Islamic Economics Bulletin, Jan-Feb 2003, pp. 1-3)*

Similarly, he gave an interview to Dr. Shariq Nisar, which was published in the *Islamic Economics Bulletin* (January–February 2003). In it, he emphasized that Islamic economics needs to adopt a more comprehensive model compared to conventional economics. We should draw guidance from Ibn Khaldun, who presented a holistic, dynamic model based on the interdependence of various societal factors.

To date, very little work of an empirical nature has been carried out. Without it, we can neither understand the true state of the Muslim world nor propose an effective strategy for the future. It is necessary to articulate the Islamic strategy clearly. This is not limited merely to reforming the financial system; rather, it encompasses the reform of human beings and all the social, economic, political, and other factors that influence human behaviour and well-being. Consequently, our focus will not remain confined solely to religious beliefs and values, but must also incorporate social, economic, financial, political, and historical factors.

Dr. Chapra states: "Islam is a complete code of life, capable of resolving the problems not only of Muslim countries, but of all humanity. Jurists (*Fuqaha*) have hitherto rejected options and derivatives, even though these are not necessarily rooted in speculation but are also utilized for risk management. If we do not accept them, we must find alternative methods for managing risk. Islamic economics requires a great deal of creative thinking to promote human welfare." *(Dr. Umar Chapra: Prohibition of Riba, Publisher: Fiqh Academy, India)*

**Prohibition of Riba — Unviable in the Modern Era?**

Dr. Umar Chapra's 60-page paper, *Prohibition of Riba*, consists of Urdu translations of three of his scholarly articles and stands as a masterpiece. Dr. Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi was so impressed by this work that he wrote in its introduction: In the history of Islamic economics, Dr. Muhammad Umar Chapra holds the same stature that Imam al-Ghazali and Imam al-Razi hold in the history of Muslim philosophy and theology.

Is interest truly prohibited in Islam? Conflicting views are still expressed on this question today. The reason is that certain Muslim intellectuals claim that what Islam prohibited was not interest (*Sood*), but *Riba*, and that interest and *Riba* are not the same thing. There are two main grounds given for this view:

Narrated by Abu Hurairah (RA), the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) said: "A time will surely come upon people when no one will remain who does not consume *Riba* (interest). Even if one does not consume it directly, its vapor or dust will reach them." *(Sunan Abi Dawud)*

This implies that within the pervasive nature of such an exploitative financial system, even if a believer attempts to avoid interest directly, the effects or dust of an interest-based economy will inevitably touch everyone's daily life.

Furthermore, the Rightly Guided Caliph, Umar (RA), mentioned that the verses regarding *Riba* (interest) were among the last revealed in the Holy Quran, and the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) passed away before fully explaining all their fine details and applications. Therefore, as a matter of caution, Umar (RA) advised: "Leave what makes you doubtful for what does not make you doubtful."

Allama Abdullah Yusuf Ali noted in his commentary that modern bank interest is not *Riba*.

Dr. Chapra thoroughly examined *Riba al-Nasi'ah* and *Riba al-Fadl*, clarifying that all forms of interest are prohibited in Islam. In doing so, he cleared up this confusion and rendered an immense service to the *Ummah*.

**Maulana Mawdudi's Contributions to Islamic Economics:** Writing about Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi's contributions, Dr. Umar Chapra noted that Mawdudi was not a professional economist, but primarily a reformer. It would be unfair to expect him to have engaged in detailed theoretical and practical economic debates. Mawdudi's core objective was to guide humanity onto the path of success while keeping the higher goals of Islamic *Shari'ah* in view. Thus, he analyzed human problems and offered solutions in light of Islamic teachings.

Dr. Chapra further writes: “To meet basic needs and rapidly improve the economic condition of the poor, Maulana Mawdudi placed the greatest emphasis on transferring resources from the rich to the poor. In his early period (1941), he posited that an immediate solution could be achieved by encouraging wealthy individuals to adopt the lifestyle of the early Muslim community—fulfilling their genuine needs and distributing their remaining income (not total wealth) among the poor, termed *Al-Afw* in the Quran.

However, later, as he likely realized the practical difficulties of implementing this approach in modern societies—which lacked the selflessness of early Muslims—he softened his stance. His revised position allowed individuals to secure their remaining funds and invest them in business, provided they fulfilled their reasonable needs and paid their obligated Islamic duties (*Zakat* and *Ushr*). Nonetheless, he continued to emphasize living a simple lifestyle and distributing as much excess income to the poor as possible. He also advocated for setting up cooperative institutions and ensuring that deceased individuals’ estates were distributed equitably according to *Shari’ah* guidelines, alongside *Zakat* and *Ushr*.”

Continuing, Dr. Chapra writes: “Maulana Mawdudi firmly believed that eliminating interest would help establish a just social order. In his writings, he demonstrated how an interest-free financial system could be realized. In this regard, he emphasized implementing profit-and-loss sharing methods (*Mudarabah* and *Musharakah*) in finance. However, the practical development of the Islamic financial system has turned out somewhat differently. It includes a significant share of sales-based financing models (*Murabaha*, *Ijarah*, *Salam*, and *Istisna*), which generate debt—though these remain distinct from the interest-bearing loans of conventional banks. While Maulana Mawdudi did not classify the notable price mark-up between cash and credit transactions (found in certain sales models like *Murabaha*) as interest, he regarded it as doubtful income that should be avoided according to Hadith.

Dr. Chapra further notes: “At the same time, [Maulana Mawdudi] expressed in several other writings that economic, social, political, and historical forces constantly shape individual behaviour. Therefore, mere preaching and admonition cannot achieve the desired results. Muslims have been accustomed to sermons for centuries, yet routine preaching has brought no noteworthy change in their character. Hence, he emphasized the need for comprehensive socio-economic transformation.

In light of Islamic teachings and drawing from historic Muslim thinkers like Abu Yusuf (d. 798 CE), Al-Mawardi (d. 1058 CE), Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328 CE), Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406 CE), and Shah Waliullah (d. 1762 CE), Mawdudi did not focus solely on economic variables in financial matters. Contrary to conventional economics, he viewed the various aspects of individual and social life as interconnected, asserting that focusing purely on economic factors is insufficient to resolve economic issues because Muslim society requires broader systemic changes alongside economic factors.”

**The Future of Economics: An Islamic Perspective:** This landmark book by Professor Chapra raises critical questions regarding the theoretical and practical dimensions of mainstream economics and provides answers to them. One key question pertains to the fundamental purpose of economics. Is its role merely to analyse and predict, or to help a society realize its vision?

If realizing a vision is essential, the question arises: What is the difference between the vision of Islam and that of conventional economics? Is it possible for economics to help achieve the Islamic vision by considering only economic variables and analysing "what is" (like conventional economics), or is it necessary to discuss the moral, psychological, social, political, and historical factors that created the gap between the vision and present reality, while proposing a strategy to bridge this gap? Has Islamic economics succeeded in meeting this challenge, and if not, what needs to be done in the future?

**Islam and the Economic Challenge:** In this book, Dr. Chapra particularly draws the younger generation toward Islamic economics. The ongoing revival of Islam across almost all Muslim countries has created the need to present a clear and coherent picture of the program Islam offers to achieve the welfare it envisions, and to confront the various problems currently facing humanity, especially in the economic sphere. Of special interest is the strategy that helps bring macroeconomic and external imbalances within manageable limits—imbalances currently faced by most countries worldwide. Yet, it must enable them to achieve full employment, eradicate poverty, fulfil basic needs, and minimize income and wealth inequality. Can Muslim countries formulate such a strategy within the secular framework of capitalism, socialism, and the welfare state? Can Islam help them achieve their goals? If so, what policy package do Islamic teachings demand? This book is an attempt to answer these and other related questions.

Similarly, in *Muslim Civilization: The Causes of Decline and the Need for Reform*, Dr. Muhammad Umar Chapra examines the decline over recent centuries of a brilliant Islamic civilizational tradition that endured for ages.

Islam seeks to establish a global society pervaded by mutual compassion and cooperation. It does not want wealth to be concentrated in the hands of a few individuals or a specific class, as stated in the Qur'an:

*كَيْ لَا يَكُونَ دُولَةً بَيْنَ الْأَغْنِيَاءِ مِنْكُمْ (Al-Hashr 59:7)* "...so that it (wealth) does not merely circulate among the rich among you."

The late Dr. Nejatullah Siddiqi predicted half a century ago that the era of Western dominance and exploitation was coming to an end, and global leadership would shift back toward the economic progress of the East. However, there is very little awareness of this among Muslim scholars and intellectuals. Today, the youth of the Muslim *Ummah*—both men and women—need to accept this challenge, just like Dr. Umar Chapra, Professor Khurshid Ahmad, Dr. Nejatullah Siddiqi, Baqir al-Sadr, and other towering figures. Along with the *Maqasid al-Shari'ah*, they must use the creative thinking emphasized by Dr. Umar Chapra to present the model of Islamic justice and equity (*Adl wa Qist*) to humanity while taking into account the challenges and opportunities of modern complexities.

May the Almighty and Glorious Lord be our Helper and Supporter. The promise of Allah is true, as He stated:

*وَالَّذِينَ جَاهَدُوا فِينَا لَنَهْدِيَنَّهُمْ سُبُلَنَا وَإِنَّ اللَّهَ لَمَعَ الْمُحْسِنِينَ (Al-Ankabut 29:69)* "And those who strive in Our cause—We will surely guide them to Our paths. And indeed, Allah is with the doers of good."

## Key Highlights of the Global Housing Crisis

### Review by Muhammad Hammad

**The Global Housing Crisis**

The global housing crisis is a multidimensional challenge driven by rising costs, rapid urbanization, and climate change, with 3.4 billion people lacking adequate housing and 44% of households globally overburdened by rent. Five core issues—affordability, displacement, informality, sustainability, and liveability—intersect to widen structural deficits, disproportionately exposing vulnerable populations and informal settlements to economic and environmental shocks despite the construction sector's massive 13% contribution to global GDP.

To resolve this crisis, governments and stakeholders must rebalance housing as both a vital social good and a strategic economic pillar within sustainable development frameworks. This requires adopting holistic, multisector strategies that combine comprehensive demand- and supply-side affordability measures, climate resilience, and formal recognition of community-led and informal housing solutions.

**What Have We Learnt from 50 Years of Housing Policy?**

Decades of market-led, ownership-centric policies have failed to resolve the global housing crisis, deepening inequalities and leaving low-income groups vulnerable to forced evictions, homelessness, and systemic human rights violations. Compounding these issues are fragmented national policies, weak multilevel governance where under-resourced local authorities struggle to implement top-down directives, and the systematic exclusion of non-state actors who drive much of the actual housing production.

To build inclusive housing systems, governments must re-establish public leadership, reclaiming control over land and finance while moving beyond property-oriented models to embrace diverse tenure types and upgrading. Effective reform requires coherent, human rights-aligned policies, empowered local governments with real decision-making authority, and inclusive stakeholder participation to ensure housing solutions match lived realities.

**The Housing Affordability Crisis**

The global housing affordability crisis has worsened significantly over the past two decades, driven by supply shortages that expanded from 251 million units in 2010 to 288 million in 2023 alongside global price-to-income ratios jumping from 9.5 to 11.7. This escalation is fuelled by rapid urbanization, soaring construction costs, and speculative financial investment, leaving 44% of global renters spending over 30% of their income on housing. The burden falls heavily on vulnerable groups—such as youth, migrants, and low-income households—widening intergenerational wealth gaps and triggering widespread tenure insecurity and displacement anxiety.

Addressing this crisis requires a comprehensive strategy that aligns housing policy with broader economic, social, and spatial planning frameworks rather than relying on isolated sector measures. Governments must reform supply systems by streamlining land management and regulations, target financial assistance toward low-income and informal workers, implement strong regulatory safeguards against corporate speculation, and build robust public-private-community partnerships to ensure lasting affordability.

**Beyond Displacement: Mitigating the Loss of Home**

With global forced displacement reaching record highs—including 123.2 million people displaced by conflict and violence, and an estimated 64 million displaced from informal settlements by urban development between 2003 and 2023—cities have become the primary frontline for these populations. Often falling through the cracks of fragmented protection regimes, urban displaced groups face severe economic exploitation, tenure insecurity, forced evictions, and heightened vulnerabilities (especially for women and minorities) while local governments lack the mandate, resources, and coordination to properly support them.

Effectively addressing urban displacement requires shifting away from short-term humanitarian aid toward integrated, city-wide development approaches that treat displaced individuals as equal urban residents. Governments must empower local authorities with clear mandates and financial resources, bridge the humanitarian-development divide, and replace top-down housing provisions with self-reliant, community-led models like cash-for-shelter and incremental upgrading that protect livelihoods and prevent forced evictions.

**Leveraging Informality for Affordable and Adequate Housing**

Informal settlements continue to expand globally, with absolute numbers rising from 895 million in 2000 to approximately 1.13 billion in 2024, driven by unplanned urbanization, rising inequality, and bureaucratic regulatory frameworks. Despite their vital role in providing affordable housing, economic opportunity, and flexible adaptation for low-income populations, informal areas remain heavily stigmatized. Consequently, many governments continue to rely on forced evictions—frequently justified by major events or climate change mitigation, while traditional upgrading programs often fail due to policy bottlenecks, poor livelihood integration, and poorly designed titling that triggers gentrification and displacement.

To address this, policies must shift from eradication and rigid frameworks toward leveraging informality as a legitimate, incremental mode of urban development. Governments must adopt collaborative, co-produced approaches with residents and civil society, reform outdated regulatory frameworks and prioritize upgrading that preserves social networks. Furthermore, securing tenure requires moving beyond narrow freehold titling to embrace a pluralistic spectrum of rights—including customary, communal, and cooperative models—while fully integrating gender perspectives and climate resilience.

**Building Climate Resilient Housing**

Housing sits at the centre of the global climate challenge, responsible for 17 to 21% of total greenhouse gas emissions and operating severely off track from Paris Agreement targets while weather-related hazards displaced 45.8 million people in 2024 alone. Low-income and informal settlements bear the brunt of these escalating risks, facing heightened vulnerability and displacement. Yet, with roughly 60% of the buildings expected to exist by 2050 yet to be constructed, the sector presents a monumental window of opportunity to simultaneously cut emissions, scale low-carbon designs, and protect vulnerable communities.

Addressing this crisis requires a whole-system national approach that accounts for whole-life carbon across the entire housing lifecycle, alongside robust multilevel governance that aligns local implementation with national frameworks. Governments must integrate housing into climate policies by empowering community-led initiatives that utilize sustainable local materials and embedding strict equity safeguards—such as prioritizing tenure security and affordability—to prevent exclusionary outcomes like green gentrification.

**Housing and the City: Delivering Equitable, Liveable and Inclusive Housing**

Rapidly rising costs, poor coordination, and widespread discrimination have fuelled severe residential segregation and urban sprawl, with urban areas expanding at nearly twice the rate of population growth since 1975. This low-density sprawl increases per-capita infrastructure costs, strains municipal budgets, and pushes low-income households into distant peripheral areas. Furthermore, treating land as a financial asset rather than a social good has resulted in paradoxically high vacancies alongside unmet needs, while low civic participation—with only 19% of cities showing strong civil society engagement in planning—leaves vulnerable groups excluded from decisions that shape their living environments.

To achieve equitable, liveable, and inclusive cities, governments must adopt proactive, pro-poor planning and governance strategies that prioritize people-centred social housing near transit corridors and jobs. This requires moving beyond superficial consultation to implement legally binding co-governance, transferring real resource control and land authority to community-based organizations. Additionally, cities must enforce robust equity safeguards—such as collective tenure security and inclusionary zoning—during neighbourhood upgrades to curb speculative displacement, prevent green gentrification, and guarantee that urban liveability functions as a universal right.

## Book Review

**Title:** Kalam and Its Relevance in Muslim Scholarship of Religion

**Editor:** Haslina Ibrahim

**Publisher:** IIUM Press, 2026




"Kalam and Its Relevance in Muslim Scholarship of Religion: An Integrated Approach" (edited by Haslina Ibrahim, IIUM Press, 2023) reclaims classical Islamic theology (Kalam) as a vital framework for contemporary comparative religion. The edited volume critiques dominant Western academic paradigms while establishing a principled model for interfaith discourse.

The book addresses a central methodological tension in religious studies: the demand for epoché, or the suspension of personal belief. Prof. Haslina Ibrahim argues that 'value-free' neutrality leads to methodological sterility.

Asking scholars to detach from their worldview strips inquiry of purpose; instead, the Kalam tradition treats theological commitment as a foundation for rigorous rational inquiry, compelling scholars to actively evaluate truth (haqq) and falsehood (batil) rather than remaining passively neutral.

To understand religion in its own right and perspective, it is not useful to have a completely neutral stance. Moreover, understanding religion from a piecemeal approach using philosophy, sociology, history, philology and phenomenology is not sufficient to understand the core contents of the religion. This is especially critical for divine religions which have a transcendent source.

Often, the Western perspective utilizes the neutral, scientific and compartmentalized method to study religion. Then, what it is able to study is the culture that emanates from the religion, the society that emerges from religion, the people who uphold religion, but not the Creator and core message and purpose of religion as spelled out in the primary texts.

When those texts are read comparatively with the presumption that the divine books are authored by some humans, some Atheists argue that there is repetition or plagiarism. This misunderstanding can be removed if one takes the perspective that the author of these divine books is not human or humans.

Rather, the message in these books is by one source and the message of Tawheed is the cornerstone of monotheistic religions. This way, religions can be better understood and compared rather than taking a neutral stance and ignoring the core contents of religion altogether.

The book also explores how early mutakallimūn (theologians) pioneered comparative studies through genres like al-Milal wa al-Nihal (religions and sects). Classical figures such as Al-Biruni, Ibn Hazm, and Al-Shahrastani demonstrate that historical Kalam engaged other traditions with empirical rigor and deep intellectual curiosity rather than mere polemical hostility.

Classical mutakallimūn (theologians) engaged non-Muslim doctrines using reason-based, conviction-anchored frameworks rather than pretending neutral disbelief. The book demonstrates that Kalam is not merely defensive polemics, but a proactive tool for ethical interreligious dialogue rooted in scripture.

The use of Kalam is quite relevant to increase engagement, dialogue and communication. What is also important is to keep the premises fact-based and cognizant of valid and proven facts. That is where, science can serve the need of verification of premises which can be studied using the scientific method. However, the Kalam as a method of inquiry and comparative study would also embed logic and rationality. The authors discuss that the use of Kalam is encouraged by the general theme of Qur'an.

Nonetheless, the use of Kalam as a method and the past use of Kalam in historical discourses are two separate things. Some scholars may have done mistakes in using Kalam in matters where direct guidance is not possible or is unambiguously provided by Qur'an.

The use of Kalam as a method of engaging with religion holistically is still important. Through concepts such as ḥiwār (constructive dialogue) and jadal (dialectical engagement), the authors reframe Kalam. It shifts the discipline from a purely defensive stance into a proactive tool for ethical, respectful interreligious engagement.

The book rejects the idea that dialogue requires flattening conviction into universal relativism. Authentic engagement occurs when scholars remain firmly grounded in their theological principles while engaging other faith traditions with fairness and empathy.

By bridging classical Uṣūl al-Dīn (foundations of religion) with modern academic methodologies, the contributors offer a roadmap for scholars navigating Western-dominated academia. The work restores Kalam as a living, adaptable methodology capable of addressing pluralism and fostering coexistence in a modern context.

Dr. Nur Farhana Abdul Rahman and Prof. Haslina Ibrahim examine Ismail Raji al-Faruqi's concept of Meta-Religion as a modern extension of Kalam. It provides a third way between dogmatic exclusivism and postmodern relativism. Al-Faruqi's formulation of universal rational criteria (grounded in Islamic metaphysics like unitarianism and logical consistency) used to evaluate religious claims on a shared, objective platform. Al-Faruqi established universal axioms to evaluate any tradition: The Law of Non-Contradiction (truth cannot contradict itself), Correspondence with Reality (doctrines must align with empirical facts and human nature), and Practical Moral Utility (faith must lead to ethical flourishing).

One of the theme in the book is to communicate the contents of religion at the grassroots. That is where, it is also important to create direct engagement with Qur'an. Qur'an itself has its own rational, logical and fact-based way of proving the religious beliefs. Therefore, the religious beliefs can be presented as justified true belief in the light of rational arguments, logical arguments, moral arguments and scientific arguments to strengthen certain premises. Kalam as a method of study and discourse has the ability to integrate revealed knowledge and provide a useful way of dialogue universally.

The message one derives from the book is that the focus should be on seeking truth rather than just assembling viewpoints or finding the human-centred reasons behind the viewpoints. Passive post-modern relativism or secular neutrality is not beneficial for seeking truth actively and openly. It is important to study other faith traditions using primary sources and rigorous textual context. Furthermore, it is pertinent to use shared rational criteria ('aql) to contrast doctrines.

Using the Qur'anic methodology, Muslims are commanded to invite the People of the Book (Ahl al-Kitāb) to a 'common word' (the worship of God alone). This illustrates starting dialogue on shared monotheistic and rational ground before addressing core theological divergences. The book mentions Prophet Muhammad's engagement with the Christian delegation of Najran in Medina. The Prophet hosted them in his mosque and permitted them to conduct their prayer rites while engaging in deep, uncompromised theological debate about the nature of Christ, demonstrating that firm doctrinal disagreement coexists with hospitality and respect.

## Research Paper in Focus

**Paper Title:** Reclaiming Economics as a Moral Science: An Islamic Approach to Monetary Reform

**Author:** Prof. Dr. Asad Zaman

**Discussant:** Prof. Dr. Tariqullah Khan

**Publisher:** Turkish Journal of Islamic Economics, 13(2), 1-21].

Prof. Zaman's paper, '*Reclaiming Economics as a Moral Science: An Islamic Approach to Monetary Reform*' argues that contemporary monetary reform remains incomplete because it concentrates on technical solutions - such as macro prudential regulation, institutional safeguards, and regulatory redesign - while insufficiently addressing justice and public welfare.

He observes that Islamic finance has developed relatively sophisticated mechanisms for micro-level Shari'ah compliance but still lacks comparable institutional capability for governing systemic outcomes in accordance with the public interest. The paper therefore reframes monetary reform as a problem not only of technical design but also of moral governance.

To address this gap, Prof. Zaman proposes a triangular ethical architecture built around three institutional pillars: banks as delegated creators and allocators of money, the state and central bank as regulators and macroeconomic coordinators, and an institutionalized moral authority charged with safeguarding justice and public purpose. The proposed Monetary Justice Commission is intended to give this moral authority an enforceable institutional form.

Using Pakistan as an illustrative case, the paper argues that monetary power rests on public trust and should therefore be treated as an *amānah*, requiring accountability, equitable distribution of gains and losses, and institutional protection of the common good across both booms and crises.

Viewed through the architecture of Dynamic Prescriptive Islamic Economics (DPIE), Prof. Zaman's argument can be formalized around two irreducible and non-substitutable dimensions: $X$ =Maqāṣid realization and $Y$ =institutional capacity, subject to a Halal floor. Prof. Asad Zaman's paper is exceptionally well suited to analysis through the full **Dynamic Prescriptive Islamic Economics (DPIE)** [https://www.tariqullah.com/dynamic-prescriptive-islamic-economics](https://www.tariqullah.com/dynamic-prescriptive-islamic-economics) architecture.

Its central thesis is already structurally two-dimensional: Islamic monetary governance requires both **normative purpose** and **institutional power capable of making that purpose operative.** The paper argues that contemporary Islamic finance has developed substantial transaction-level Shari'ah-compliance capacity but lacks equivalent institutional capability for protecting justice and public welfare at the system level. The paper therefore provides almost a textbook case for the DPIE proposition that **Maqāṣid and institutional capacity are irreducible and non-substitutable dimensions.**
We would formalize the paper as

$\boxed{X = \text{Maqasid Realization}}$ $\boxed{Y = \text{Institutional Capacity}}$
with the target

$$v^* = (+1, +1)$$

and with a **Halal floor as an admissibility constraint rather than as a substitute for the X-axis.** This distinction is crucial because Prof. Zaman himself argues that a system composed of halal contracts can nevertheless generate injustice, exclusion and harmful systemic outcomes: "micro halal does not guarantee macro justice." Thus, **Halal is the floor; Maqāṣid is the direction of improvement beyond the floor.**

## Level 1 — Normative and Diagnostic Architecture

### 1. The Halal Floor

The strongest DPIE interpretation is:

$$H \geq H_{\min}$$

as a prior admissibility condition.

A monetary arrangement that violates the minimum requirements of Shari'ah does not become acceptable simply because it produces high welfare or has excellent institutions. Conversely, satisfying the Halal floor does **not** place a monetary system at

$X = +1$. It only makes the system eligible for evaluation in the Maqāṣid-institutional space.

This is precisely the distinction the paper seeks to recover. Contemporary Shari'ah governance has concentrated on product certification, Shari'ah boards and formal contract compliance, while systemic justice, inclusion and welfare remain inadequately governed.

**2. Normalized Balanced Coordinates**

A workable DPIE rubric would be:

| Score | X — Maqāṣid Realization | Y — Institutional Capacity |
|---|---|---|
| +1.0 | Justice, maṣlaḥah, amānah, inclusion and avoidance of harm demonstrably govern monetary outcomes across boom and bust | Independent, adaptive, transparent and capture-resistant institutions possess enforceable authority, data, sanctions and learning mechanisms |
| +0.5 | Explicit Maqāṣid objectives influence credit allocation and distributive outcomes, with measurable public-benefit performance | Coordinated macro-Shari'ah governance exists with meaningful independence, monitoring and enforcement |
| 0.0 | **Halal/Maqāṣid threshold:** formal permissibility exists but systemic contribution to justice is neutral, uncertain or unverified | Institutions exist, but macro-ethical mandate, independence or enforcement remains incomplete |
| −0.5 | Formally compliant finance generates material exclusion, concentration, speculative harm or inequitable burden sharing | Fragmented, conflicted or largely symbolic governance; significant capture and implementation weaknesses |
| −1.0 | Systematic injustice, exploitation, public losses/private gains and severe violation of public welfare | Institutional collapse, capture or deliberate use of monetary power against public interest |

The paper gives direct justification for the positive end of the X-axis: monetary authority is an **amānah** and must promote ʿ**adl and maṣlaḥah**, prevent harm and serve social well-being. It simultaneously justifies the Y-axis by insisting that moral intentions remain ineffective unless translated into formal institutional structures with enforcement.

**3. Four DPIE Quadrants**

Using standard Cartesian labeling:

| Quadrant | Coordinates | DPIE monetary archetype | Interpretation of Zaman's argument |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q1 | $+X, +Y$ | **Maqāṣid-Institutional Falāḥ** | Ethical purpose and effective governance reinforce one another |
| Q2 | $-X, +Y$ | **Technocratic/Compliance Trap** | Strong institutions and technical capability without sufficient systemic justice |
| Q3 | $-X, -Y$ | **Captured Monetary Disorder** | Weak Maqāṣid outcomes combined with weak/captured institutions |
| Q4 | $+X, -Y$ | **Moral Aspiration Trap** | Strong moral objectives but insufficient institutional capacity to implement them |

This reveals something particularly important about the paper: Prof. **Zaman is effectively trying to join Q2 and Q4 in order to produce Q1.**

Mainstream macro prudential economics possesses sophisticated institutional tools but, in the paper's analysis, it largely excludes questions of justice and distribution. It therefore approximates **Q2.** Islamic moral economy, by contrast, possesses a strong normative conception of justice but lacks "institutional teeth" at the macro level, approximating **Q4.**

The paper's triangular governance proposal is explicitly an attempt to escape both traps simultaneously.

**Level 2 — Prescriptive DPIE Architecture**

**4. The Proposed Q1 Institutional Configuration**

The paper proposes three integrated pillars: banks and financial institutions; the state and central bank; and an institutionalized moral authority. The third pillar is not intended as symbolic Shari'ah review but as a standing governance institution possessing legitimacy and enforceable restraint.

This can be represented as:

$$(-,+)_{Q2} + (+,-)_{Q4} \xrightarrow{\text{institutional integration}} (+,+)_{Q1}$$

This is perhaps the paper's deepest DPIE insight. **Technical capacity cannot compensate for missing Maqāṣid, while moral aspiration cannot compensate for missing institutional capacity.**

The paper explicitly reaches essentially the same non-substitutability conclusion when it says that technical and legal pillars without moral governance remain vulnerable to circumvention and capture, whereas moral critique without institutional levers produces denunciation rather than effective governance.

**5. d-Gap**

DPIE measures distance from the desired state:

$$d = \sqrt{(1-x)^2 + (1-y)^2}$$

The crucial value of $d$ here is conceptual rather than merely mathematical. A system cannot compensate for poor Maqāṣid performance through additional regulatory sophistication, nor compensate for weak institutions through greater ethical rhetoric.

For illustration, the paper's diagnosis of contemporary Islamic finance might reasonably be located approximately around

$$v_0 = (-, 0.25 + 0.35),$$

meaning that institutional machinery is clearly present, but systemic Maqāṣid realization remains deficient. This is an **illustrative DPIE coding, not an empirical estimate reported by Prof. Zaman**.

It gives approximately

$$d_0 \approx 1.41.$$

By contrast, a successfully implemented Monetary Justice Commission architecture might aspire toward something such as

$$v_1 = (+, 0.80 + 0.75),$$

which would reduce the gap to approximately

$$d_1 \approx 0.32.$$

The important point is not these particular numerical estimates but the **direction and measurability of transition**.

**6. Weakest-Link Principle**

DPIE adds a particularly valuable constraint:

$$P = \min(x, y).$$

Under this criterion, a monetary system with $x = 0.90$, but $y = -0.40$ cannot be described as highly Islamic merely because its objectives are admirable. Its effective systemic performance is constrained by institutional incapacity.

Likewise,

$$(x, y) = (-, 0.400.90)$$

does not constitute successful Islamic monetary governance simply because the central bank, regulators and Shari'ah boards are technically sophisticated.

This formalizes the paper's essential argument: **neither Maqāṣid nor institutional capacity can substitute for the other.**

**7. STO Architecture**

Prof. Zaman already provides much of the substance required for DPIE's **Substitution-Transformation-Offset** mechanism.

| DPIE instrument | Application to the Zaman Architecture | Intended Movement |
|---|---|---|
| S — Substitution | Replace transaction-only Shari'ah review with macro-Shari'ah assessment; replace bank-dependent scholar appointments with independent arrangements; replace private-entitlement understanding of money creation with delegated public trust | Remove structures producing low $X$ or low $Y$ |
| T — Transformation | Establish the Monetary Justice Commission; give moral authority, a formal governance status; introduce annual macro-Shari'ah opinions; embed public-interest duties in licensing and supervision | Raise $X$ and $Y$ structurally |
| O — Offsets | Counteract unavoidable distributive harm through burden-sharing rules, crisis-protection mechanisms, anti-capture safeguards and compensatory public-interest arrangements | Prevent shocks from pushing the system back toward Q2/Q3 |

The paper itself contains exceptionally concrete transformations. It proposes macro-ethical Shari'ah opinions covering balance sheets, credit allocation, risk and public-interest performance; treating money creation as delegated public authority; and insulating Shari'ah oversight from commercial capture through centralized financing and appointment structures.

The **Offset** category is less explicitly developed in the paper. DPIE therefore adds value here. Prof. Zaman explains what institutions should prevent, but a fuller DPIE implementation would explicitly specify how unavoidable monetary shocks, banking failures, inflationary costs or adjustment losses are to be distributed without violating Maqāṣid.

**8. Transition Velocity $\tau$**

With

$$d_{\max} = 2\sqrt{2},$$

a normalized position indicator can be written as

$$\tau = 1 - \frac{d}{2\sqrt{2}}.$$

More importantly, DPIE treats **change in τ through time** as a governance indicator.

A reform that establishes a Monetary Justice Commission but leaves appointment capture intact may produce very little real increase in $\tau$. Conversely, if public-interest credit allocation, independence, transparency and distributive justice improve simultaneously, the system is genuinely converging toward $v^* = (1, 1)$.

This prevents **institutional relabeling from being confused with transformation**—precisely one of Prof. Zaman's own concerns about symbolic Shari'ah governance.

**Level 3 — Nonlinear Dynamic DPIE**

This is where DPIE adds the largest analytical extension to the paper.

Prof. Zaman recognizes that financial systems are endogenous and adaptive. Stability itself encourages greater risk-taking; new rules produce regulatory circumvention; regulated institutions adapt; and regulators can become captured. He consequently rejects a once-and-for-all technical solution.

That logic should be formalized dynamically as

$$x_{t+1} = F(x_t, y_t, S_t, T_t, O_t, C_t, \epsilon_t)$$
$$y_{t+1} = G(y_t, x_t, S_t, T_t, O_t, C_t, \epsilon_t),$$

where $C_t$represents **capture, regulatory arbitrage and political-economic resistance**, while $\epsilon_t$ represents shocks such as crises.

The functions should be **nonlinear**, because the paper itself implies threshold effects. A small deterioration in regulatory independence may initially have little visible consequence but, beyond a capture threshold, can destroy institutional credibility very rapidly. Similarly, severe financial crises can produce discontinuous movements in Maqāṣid outcomes through unemployment, foreclosure and asymmetric bailouts.

Thus:

$$\frac{\partial x}{\partial y} > 0,\ \frac{\partial y}{\partial x} > 0$$

need not be constant. Strong institutions can improve Maqāṣid outcomes; legitimacy and public trust can, in turn, strengthen institutional effectiveness. Conversely, simultaneous deterioration can produce a reinforcing movement toward Q3.

This is a **major DPIE extension beyond the paper**. Prof. Zaman describes the feedback processes convincingly—the rules/evasion/revision cycle is explicitly discussed —but does not yet convert them into an explicit nonlinear state-transition model.

**9. AER — Accumulated Epistemic Rationality**

The proposed Monetary Justice Commission provides an unusually good institutional home for **AER**.

Each policy cycle would generate evidence on credit allocation, financial inclusion, concentration, household vulnerability, systemic fragility, distribution of gains and losses, complaints, Shari'ah performance and public legitimacy. The Commission already envisaged by Zaman brings economists, civil society and ʿulamāʾ into the governance process.

DPIE would convert this into:

$$AER_t \to \text{measurement} \to (x_t, y_t) \to d_t \to STO_t \to (x_{t+1}, y_{t+1}) \to AER_{t+1}$$

The framework therefore becomes **learning governance**, rather than a static Islamic monetary constitution.

**10. Dynamic Iteration**

The complete DPIE policy loop for the paper becomes:

$$\boxed{\text{Halal Floor} \to (x_t, y_t) \to \text{Quadrant} \to d_t \to \min(x_t, y_t) \to STOs \to \tau \to \text{Outcome Evidence} \to AER \to (x_{t+1}, y_{t+1})}$$

The cycle repeats because neither financial behaviour nor political institutions are stationary.

This is particularly compatible with Prof. Zaman's insistence that **justice operate as a binding constraint throughout the business cycle**, rather than only being evaluated after crises occur.

**Overall DPIE Assessment**

The paper can be interpreted as a remarkably strong **proto-DPIE monetary-governance architecture**.

Its central contribution is not merely the proposed Monetary Justice Commission. More fundamentally, it identifies **two failures of one-dimensional reasoning**:

$$\boxed{\text{Maqasid without institutions} \to Q4}$$

and

$$\boxed{\text{Institutions without Maqasid} \to Q2}.$$

The proposed solution is therefore logically

$$\boxed{Q4 + Q2 \longrightarrow Q1: (+, 1 + 1)}$$

rather than maximizing either dimension independently.

I would assess its compatibility with the full DPIE architecture at approximately **9/10 conceptually.** It already supplies the Halal-versus-justice distinction, irreducible normative and institutional dimensions, explicit capture mechanisms, system-level governance, concrete institutional reforms and an inherently dynamic understanding of finance. What is missing for a fully operational DPIE model is principally the **normalized −1 to +1 rubrics, explicit quadrant diagnostics, d-gap, weakest-link criterion, STO classification, τ measurement, empirical indicators, AER learning loop and formal nonlinear state-transition equations**.

The most important intellectual contribution DPIE adds is therefore not to replace Prof. Zaman's triangular architecture, but to **embed it within a measurable dynamic system**. Prof. Zaman provides the institutional theory; DPIE turns it into a **diagnostic → prescriptive → nonlinear adaptive governance architecture directed toward the joint Maqāṣid-institutional ideal** $v^* = (1, 1)$.

In my assessment, this is one of the clearest applications of the full DPIE architecture because the paper itself demonstrates why **Halal compliance is a necessary floor, Maqāṣid realization is the normative destination, and institutional capacity is the non-substitutable means by which that destination becomes governable.**

## Reflections on the Questions of Origins

Human body structure might have evolved to be in the present form, but the Ultimate Creator has given us the human soul and spirit which has consciousness like animals, but also has conscience. To focus attention on consciousness alone is to live with survival instincts and ignore higher morals. To act on goodness suggested by conscience requires looking beyond animal instincts and embrace goodness as a habit and willful choice. Accountability in life hereafter urges that and promises cause and effect in moral matters.

The medical cure for Corona Virus can be sought keeping in view the viral behaviour in bio-chemistry. But, the cure for purifying human soul lies in looking beyond viral, bacterial, cellular and animal behaviour and paying attention to goodness in behaviour urged by the conscience in human soul.

In the Godless worldview, the battle of survival ends with destruction eventually for Corona Virus, bacteria, other unicellular organisms and multi-cellular organisms like animals and humans the same way.

Humans having consciousness and conscience may define their personal meaning of life by themselves as to how best to spend few million breaths under the sun in maximizing self-pleasure. But, the life ends without due justice for many people who are killed, robbed and discriminated against and it ends without due punishment for many people who cause these crimes. Some are lucky and some are unlucky in the mortal combat of survival of the fittest.

Belief in single origin of life from the Ultimate Creator brings humility that we are one of many creations in the universe and should not be proud as all creatures have single source of origin, no matter howsoever they differ in the chemical composition of their bodies and respective strengths. Faith based worldview explains how and why humans are different from other species in their strong sense of morality. It urges them to be thankful to their Creator and shun any pride because they too belong to the same Creator.

It informs them that their free will allows them to choose the right and wrong paths in life. After they die, they will be held accountable for the use of free will in choosing goodness over evil, ethical over unethical and fair over unfair acts. It will provide them the chance to earn eternal blessing if they choose the righteous behaviour.

Else, they will be held accountable if they choose evil over goodness, unethical over ethical and unfair over fair acts. Not only this worldview makes life meaningful, but fulfils the aspiration of seeing absolute justice not just for oneself, but for everyone.

Author of the book 'Selfish Gene', Prof. Richard Dawkins once said that evolution is the biggest show on earth. We learn the characters in the show and their respective evolving roles, but forget who is running the show and the purpose of that show. We are all part of the show as well at some point. Some episodes of the show are missing. Initial pages are muted. There are no living characters, but just description of details of the environment in the scene. One by one, characters start appearing. To get to know these other characters and their physical attributes does not make us the Producer and Director of that show.

Some of the evolutionary biologists who do not believe in any God review the previous episodes of the show by literally reading the plot line by line, but miss some important scenes that define the whole plot. They also miss the point that the writer does not start any story by introducing himself explicitly. He only introduces his characters and then makes them play out their roles.

What these scientists are quoting from the plot is not necessarily wrong. Perhaps they are quoting exactly the pages of the plot they like and read again and again. But, why the show is happening in the first place? Who is running it? What is the role of human characters in this show? We can only learn from the Producer and Director of the show. He has spoken to us through some of his characters as messengers.

The important details of such correspondence are all available inside the plot through the lives and documented dialogues of those messengers. But, the eyes of some people just focus on what they want to see. They have the remote to go to where they can find sensible answers to the entire plot. But, they do not want to see those details. They like the scenes where everyone plays their role in predictable ways day after day. It allows them to make predictions about future episodes.

They forget those are just selected scenes of the plot, but not the entire plot. But, their refusal to pay attention to the whole plot would not change the plot. Eventually when the show is over, the ending would not be what they want or what any of the characters in the show want, but what the Producer and Director of that show wants.

Human characters in the show are given more leverage by the Producer and Director to play out their roles in the way they want. Some humans miscalculate this freedom, its limits and their own potential. They use the delegated authority to forget, disregard, downplay, undermine and even get rid of the Producer and Director.

Some other non-living and apparently weaker and smaller characters are sometimes used by the Director to remind humans to be humble, have humility and paint their legacy among the good characters in the show. It is up to humans to paint their destiny. If they follow the Director's guidelines, they can be signed for an even greater show which will begin for never ending again and which will give righteous people with virtuous behaviour the chance to play out their roles without any grief, sorrow and limits.

## Market News

### Islamic Banking & Finance

- Pakistan has potential to expand role in Islamic Finance, says ICCD chief (Dawn, Aug 28).
- SBI leads $68 million raise by stablecoin powered Islamic bank Fasset (Ledger Insights, Aug 24).
- Islamic Finance products: still a niche in Germany (Goethe University Frankfurt, Aug 25).
- IFSB highlights potential of technology in addressing gaps in Islamic Finance (Trend News Agency, Aug 26).
- Islamic banks' remittance receipts fall 27% in June (The Daily Star, Aug 20).
- Malaysia's strongest card in multi-hub push could be Islamic Finance (The Business Times, Aug 27).
- Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank plans rights issue to raise up to $477 million (Zawya, Aug 26).
- Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank's board approves Dh 1.75 billion rights issue (Khaleej Times, Aug 25).
- Uzbekistan approves rules allowing banks to convert to Islamic banking (Darya.uz, Aug 06).
- UAE remains major remittance market as outward transfers jump 28% to Dh 188.8 billion (Khaleej Times, Aug 26).
- Bank lending in Oman jumps 12.3% as deposits climb 13% (Muscat Daily, Aug 30).
- Tashkent aims to rival Dubai and Riyadh in Islamic Fintech sector (Upper News, Aug 27).

### Sukuk

- CIMB settles $342 million tokenized Sukuk using tokenized deposits in Malaysian first (Ledger Insights, Aug 27).
- Fitch-rated hard-currency Sukuk climbs 13% to exceed $221 billion in H1 (Arab News PK, Aug 29).
- Saudi Arabia raises $2.54 billion in August Sukuk issuance (Arab News PK, Aug 19).
- Egypt plans first tax Sukuk issuance in FY2026/27 with tax-exempt returns (Arab News PK, Aug 11).
- 20% of Sukuk Capital's financing goes to industrial companies (Arab News PK, Aug 05).
- Egypt holds nearly half of Africa's $7 billion Sukuk market, Fitch says (Arab News, Aug 19).
- Sukuk liquidity nears pre-war levels as recovery remains uneven: Fitch (Arab News, Aug 16).
- Shari'ah-based institutions will get 50% of any Sukuk: BB (The Daily Star, Aug 18).
- Maybank completes RM 4.8 billion Tier 2 Sukuk issuance (Business Today Malaysia, Aug 11).
- NDMC closes August Sukuk issuance at SAR 9.5 billion (Aurqam, Aug 18).
- Sports Toto subscribes for RM 17 million Sukuk in related-party transaction (The Edge Malaysia, Aug 21).
- PAAB issues RM 720 million world's largest blue Sukuk (The Star, Aug 03).

- Shein's Hong Kong listing wraps at half what Mubadala paid as Qatar pays up for repeat Sukuk issuance (Enterprise AM, Aug 31).
- Saudi Arabia opens August 'Sah' Sukuk with 4.7% annual return (Arab News PK, Aug 03).
- Gov't to auction 8 series of Sukuk on 26 August, eyes IDR 10 trillion (idnfinancials.com, Aug 20).
- Brunei capital market seminar highlights Sukuk as an alternative financing instrument (The Star, Aug 15).

## Takaful

- Ethiopia marks new Milestone in interest-free banking and Takaful development (Binance, Aug 20).
- Takaful Malaysia 2Q Net profit rises to RM 88.83 million, Aug 20).
- Takaful Emarat posts 46% surge in half-year profit as revenue and Takaful Service result climb (Gulf News, Aug 12).
- Noor Takaful surpasses N 1.3 billion in surplus distribution (This Day Live, Aug 11).
- Egypt to begin August Takaful & Karama payments for 4.7 million families worth over EGP 4 billion (Arab News, Aug 14).
- MNRB to sell Takaful Ikhlas to Bank Rakyat for RM 1.64 billion (The Edge Malaysia, Aug 04).
- Crown Takaful distributes over N 100 million to participants (Business News Nigeria, Aug 06).

## Zakat

- MAYBANK: H1 2026 profit after tax and Zakat fell 0.9% year-over-year to RM 5,171.0 million (Trading View, Aug 27).
- Proceeds from Zakat al-Mal up 44 percent in July (Edition.mv, Aug 31).
- Anaam Holding cuts Zakat claims to SAR 51.3 million (Arab News, Aug 23.
- MUZASAF disburses ₦45 million Zakat proceeds to empower the needy (The Guardian Nigeria News, Aug 06).

## Waqf

- Waqf Board issues Rs 28.9 crore recovery notice, files FIR (The Times of India, Aug 26).
- Karnataka's registered Waqf properties cross 50,000 mark (Udayavani, Aug 30).

# Economic and Financial Indicators

## Islamic Banking Statistics 2026

| Country | CAR | Gross NPF | ROA | ROE | Net Profit Margin | Cost to Income |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bahrain | 19.5 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 10.2 | 37.3 | 54.1 |
| Bangladesh | 21.2 | 1.2 | 0.5 | 11.1 | 34.4 | 54.8 |
| Brunei | 19.1 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 15.3 | 69.7 | 30.3 |
| Egypt | 18.62 | 2.98 | 3.50 | 40.58 | 63.70 | 18.56 |
| Indonesia | 25.51 | 2.14 | 2.65 | 19.25 | 36.34 | 63.66 |
| Jordan | 19.4 | 2.0 | 1.5 | 16.9 | 51.4 | 48.6 |
| Kuwait | 17.7 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 11.9 | 56.3 | 41.3 |
| Malaysia | 17.7 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 14.3 | 38.9 | 41.2 |
| Morocco | 20.0 | 0.3 | -1.5 | -17.3 | -63.3 | 159.6 |
| Nigeria | 10.26 | 5.11 | 2.54 | 88.57 | 32.11 | 62.8 |
| Oman | 15.6 | 3.2 | 1.2 | 8.8 | 36.4 | 56.8 |
| Pakistan | 24.9 | 4.6 | 5.3 | 78.4 | 62.9 | 36.1 |
| Palestine | 15.2 | 6.3 | -0.1 | -0.7 | -1.4 | 68.4 |
| Qatar | 20.7 | 3.8 | 1.5 | 13.6 | 26.2 | 8.8 |
| Saudi Arabia | 19.6 | 0.9 | 2.39 | 18.0 | 62.6 | 37.4 |
| Sudan | 8.60 | 4.68 | 3.01 | 34.1 | 37.5 | 50.0 |
| Turkey | 18.5 | 9.8 | 3.4 | 42.9 | 41.6 | 42.6 |
| UAE | 18.3 | 4.9 | 2.4 | 18.7 | 39.7 | 56.8 |

**Source: IFSB Data**

**Table 1.1: Islamic Financial Services Industry Size by Sector and Region (2025)**

| Region | Islamic Banking Assets | Şukūk Outstanding | Islamic Funds Assets | Islamic Insurance Assets | Total (USD Billions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) | 375.85 | 491.40 | 46.54 | 22.49 | 936.28 |
| Europe and Central Asia (ECA) | 104.35 | 37.71 | 71.62 | 3.32 | 217.00 |
| Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) | 1,759.65 | 543.29 | 34.21 | 30.22 | 2,367.37 |
| Middle East and North Africa (MENA exc.GCC) | 702.00 | 6.80 | 0.11 | 13.64 | 722.54 |
| South Asia (SA) | 94.74 | 3.44 | 6.19 | 1.44 | 105.82 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) | 14.36 | 1.19 | 15.20 | 0.04 | 30.79 |
| Others | - | 16.99 | 6.60 | - | 23.60 |
| | 3,050.94 | 1,100.83 | 180.47 | 71.14 | 4,403.39 |

**Figure 1.2: Regional and Sectoral Distribution of Global IFSI Assets**

Mature Islamic finance markets in GCC and EAP account for 75% of the global IFSI asset base

Islamic banking continues to dominate, representing nearly 70% of global Islamic financial assets.

**1. Regional Distribution of Global IFSI Assets**
*(Percent)*




**2. Sectoral Distribution of Global IFSI Assets**
*(Percent)*



Sectoral composition varies and most continue to be banking dominant. While capital markets have developed to varying extents in different regions, Islamic insurance represent a consistently marginal share across all markets.

**3. Regional Sectoral Assets**
*(Percent)*




## Figure 1.3: Islamic Banking Developments

Islamic banking assets have grown steadily across all regions, with a global CAGR(5yr) of 10.6%

**1. Islamic Banking Assets (2012-2025)**
*(Billions USD)*




Frontier and emerging markets continue to record high growth rates outpacing established markets

**2. CAGR of Regional Islamic Banking Assets (2020-2025)**
*(Percent)*




On the asset side, ṣukūk holdings and interbank financing expanded faster than financing portfolios in some regions

On the liabilities side, interbank funding and ṣukūk issuances are increasing in many jurisdictions

**3. Regional Asset Composition Changes**

*Change in percent (from 2020 to 2025)*




**4. Regional Funding Composition Changes**

*Change in percent (from 2020 to 2025)*




Murābaḥah and commodity murābaḥah account for significant portion of financing contracts globally

**5. Global Financing by Contract (2025Q3)**

*(Percent)*




Debt-based remunerative deposits constitute the dominant share of Islamic banks' funding composition

**6. Global Composition of Deposits (2025Q3)**

*(Percent)*



16 Domestic Systemic Important (DSI) markets retained 93% of global Islamic banking assets

**7. Islamic Banking Share in Total Banking Assets by Jurisdiction (2025Q3)**

*(Percent)*




Double-digit growth rates across many jurisdictions, including frontier and established markets

**8. Islamic Banking Growth Rates (5-yr CAGR) Across Jurisdictions**

*(Percent)*




Source: IFSB PSIFIs

## Figure 1.4: Islamic Insurance Growth Trends

Global Islamic insurance assets have grown steadily, surpassing USD 70 billion in 2025Q3

**1. Islamic Insurance Total Assets**

*(USD Billions)*




Established markets account for three-quarters of global Islamic insurance assets

Frontier markets are growing at a faster pace than mature markets

**2. Regional Share of Islamic Insurance Assets (2025Q3)**

*(Percent)*




**3. Total Assets Change in Percent (2021 – 2025Q3)**

*(Percent)*




Source: IFSB PSIFIs, data provided by regulators and public institutional data

## Figure 1.5: Islamic Capital Market Size and Issuances

Outstanding ṣukūk crossed the USD 1 trillion threshold in 2025: a structural milestone for the global Islamic capital market

**1. Global Ṣukūk Issuances and Outstanding (2004–2025)**

*(USD Billions)*




Activity remains highly concentrated in core markets (GCC and EAP) which accounted for 91% of issuances

Composition varied by region, with sovereign and other government related issuances being dominant in many jurisdictions

**2. Ṣukūk Issuances by Region (2025)**




**3. Ṣukūk issuances in 2025 per region and issuer type**




AT1 capital ṣukūk issuance more than doubled in 2025, driven predominantly by GCC-based Islamic banks

Sustainability-related issuances increased significantly, though it remains a modest share of the broader market

## SUKUK Investments (Source: S& P Dow Jones)
















## Global Economic Perspectives

| COUNTRY | GDP Growth (%) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
| Albania | 3.4 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| Algeria | 3.4 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| Azerbaijan | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| Bahrain | 2.9 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.2 |
| Bangladesh | 3.8 | 4.9 | 5.7 | 5.8 | 6.7 | 6.5 |
| Benin | 7.0 | 6.7 | 6.6 | 6.5 | 6.0 | 6.0 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 2.4 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| Brunei Darussalam | 1.8 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 2.9 |
| Burkina Faso | 4.0 | 4.8 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 4.7 |
| Chad | 3.3 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 4.0 | 4.1 |
| Comoros | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 3.8 | 3.8 |
| Djibouti | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.5 |
| Egypt | 4.3 | 4.7 | 5.4 | 4.9 | 5.1 | 5.3 |
| Gambia | 6.0 | 5.1 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| Guinea | 7.2 | 10.5 | 10.7 | 10.8 | 11.3 | 7.8 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 5.1 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.2 |
| Indonesia | 4.9 | 5.1 | 5.1 | 5.0 | 5.1 | 5.1 |
| Iran | 0.6 | 1.1 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Iraq | 0.5 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 4.1 |
| Jordan | 2.7 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| Kazakhstan | 5.9 | 4.4 | 4.2 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 3.4 |
| Kuwait | 2.6 | 3.9 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| Kyrgyz Republic | 8.0 | 5.3 | 5.8 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 |
| Libya | 15.6 | 4.2 | 2.3 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.2 |
| Malaysia | 4.5 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Maldives | 4.8 | 4.5 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Mauritania | 4.0 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 5.6 | 4.6 | 3.0 |
| Morocco | 4.4 | 4.2 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 3.8 |
| Niger | 6.6 | 6.7 | 6.5 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.0 |
| Nigeria | 3.9 | 4.4 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Oman | 2.9 | 4.0 | 3.7 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 3.6 |
| Pakistan | 2.7 | 3.2 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 |
| Qatar | 2.9 | 6.1 | 7.8 | 3.5 | 1.6 | 3.4 |
| Saudi Arabia | 4.0 | 4.5 | 3.6 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 |
| Senegal | 6.0 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.6 |
| Sudan | 3.2 | 9.5 | 14.9 | 9.3 | 6.5 | 5.5 |
| Tajikistan | 7.5 | 5.5 | 4.8 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 |
| Tunisia | 2.5 | 2.1 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 |
| Türkiye | 3.5 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.8 |
| Turkmenistan | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 |
| United Arab Emirates | 4.8 | 5.0 | 4.7 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 3.9 |
| Uzbekistan | 6.8 | 6.0 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.7 |
| Yemen | -1.5 | N.A | 6.0 | 5.5 | 5.0 | 5.0 |

**Source: World Bank Global Economic Perspectives, January 2026**

## Call for Papers

Redefining luxury consumption in the age of Artificial Intelligence
European Journal of Marketing
https://www.emerald.com/ejm/calls-for-submissions/1642/Redefining-luxury-consumption-in-the-age-of

4th International Conference on Islamic and Halal Economic Studies (ICIHES 2026)
15 & 16 October 2026, Burapha University, Thailand
https://submit.confbay.com/conf/icihes2026

The 14th ASEAN Universities International Conference on Islamic Finance (AICIF 2026)
13 - 15 October 2026, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Indonesia
https://submit.confbay.com/conf/aicif2026

6th UUM International Islamic Business Management Conference (IBMC 2026)
20 - 21 October 2026 (Hybrid), Raia Hotel & Convention Centre, Alor Setar, Kedah, Malaysia
https://submit.confbay.com/conf/ibmc2026

## Other Resources on Islamic Economics Project Portal

- Research Articles
- Research Presentations
- Islamic Finance Calculators
- Course Outlines
- Academic Resources
- Data Resources Links
- Islamic Economics Journals List
- Qur'an and Hadith on Economics
- Book Reviews
- Frequently Asked Questions
- Topical Bibliographies
- Islamic Finance Education Providers
- Researchers Database in Islamic Economics
- Call for Papers
- Glossary of Islamic Finance
- Video Library

islamiceconomicsproject@gmail.com
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